Swarthmore College

Works
Political Science Faculty Works

Political Science

2016

How Suffrage Politics Made—And Makes—America
Richard M. Valelly , '75
Swarthmore College, rvalell1@swarthmore.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://works.swarthmore.edu/fac-poli-sci
Part of the Political Science Commons

Let us know how access to these works benefits you

Recommended Citation
Richard M. Valelly , '75. (2016). "How Suffrage Politics Made—And Makes—America". Oxford Handbook Of
American Political Development. DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199697915.013.34
https://works.swarthmore.edu/fac-poli-sci/622

This work is brought to you for free by Swarthmore College Libraries' Works. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Political Science Faculty Works by an authorized administrator of Works. For more information, please contact
myworks@swarthmore.edu.

CHAPTER 22

HOW SUFFRAGE POLITICS
MADE — AND MAKES —
AMERICA
RICHARD M. VALELLY

Suffrage politics emerged very early in American political development.* In the late
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, constitutional conventions and state legis
latures debated the right to vote—and such assemblies expanded the suffrage for white
adult men. Another leap in suffrage expansion came after the Civil War when black
adult males joined the electorate and the Fifteenth Amendment became part of the
Constitution. The march of democratization seemed unstoppable.
But this second great extension abruptly faced fierce white supremacist resistance as
the Ku Klux Klan spread across the South. Congress enacted several federal elections
statutes to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment. Though this is little known, the federal
government did shut the Klan down—and acted vigorously in other ways to protect
black voting rights. But such rights remained uncertain. For decades the major political
parties and third parties in Southern states battled over “a free ballot and a fair count.”
In the end democracy took a wrong turn. The division over black voting rights
ended in effective nullification of the Fifteenth Amendment by about 1900. Southern
Democrats pushed black voters and politicians out of competitive politics in the South.
Yet even as democracy contracted along the color line, women won the Nineteenth
Amendment to the Constitution, a measure that nationalized female suffrage. As
women voted and ran for office the major parties changed how they organized them
selves. Women’s advocacy groups also became part of national policymaking.
Black voting rights struggles meanwhile gradually emerged once again in the exConfederacy. By the 1960s they commanded national attention. The 1965 Voting Rights
Act accelerated the redemocratization of American politics. Through its implementa
tion and enforcement the Act became a key foundation of an increasingly biracial public
sphere. As Congress renewed the Act in 1970,1975,1982, and 2006 it added protections
for Asian American, Latino, and Native American voters.
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Nonetheless, minority voting rights can still be found high on the national agenda.
In June 2013 the Supreme Court sharply scaled back the 1965 Voting Rights Act with
its 5-4 decision in Shelby v. Holder. The decision stopped direct administrative supervi
sion from Washington, DC, of changes in election law in those states and counties that
the Act once “covered.” As Erwin Chemerinsky, dean of the law school at University of
California at Irvine, wrote about Shelby v. Holder, “This is the first time since the 19th
century that a federal civil rights law has been declared unconstitutional” (Chemerinsky
2015).
Another kind of voting rights struggle has also erupted—and now differentiates the
parties—because voter eligibility has become hotly contested. Such divergence is due
to the diffusion of “voter ID” laws, propelled by state Republican parties. Republicancontrolled state governments have sought to require proof of eligibility to vote as a way
to prevent voter fraud. Republicans firmly believe that such fraud is real and that it ben
efits Democrats. But Democrats cry foul; they see “vote suppression.”
The nation that pioneered mass suffrage remains remarkably entangled in contesta
tion over the right to vote. That fact might put a dent in national pride, but it is a gift
to historical social science. The persistence and continuity of suffrage politics over the
entire course of American political development provides major analytic opportunities
for political scientists.
We can identify and analyze a wide range of concomitants: policy effects; patterns of
collective action; legal mobilization and change; shifts in who holds public office; and
effects on federalism. We also can fashion a theory of American suffrage politics. This
chapter does both: it first sketches the major byproducts of suffrage politics and then
proposes an approach centered on the role of political parties.
My “party-centered” approach identifies (1) several types of enfranchisement and
disenfranchisement; (2) the construction of suffrage regimes, that is, bundles of
institutions and election law that are meant to buttress allocations of voting rights;
and (3) the backlash (or “reactive sequences”) associated with particularly divisive
forms of suffrage politics. A party-centered approach also underscores that Americas
struggles over the right to vote are, in cross-national perspective, not just unusual but
highly unusual.

Policy Effects
Suffrage politics has continuously mixed and remixed the national and state-level issue
agendas, either when new voters came in or when existing voters were pushed out. A
key mechanism behind agenda change was the altered perception of party politicians of
what issues mattered—due, in turn, to their attentiveness to public opinion and expo
sure to new constituents, activists, and public commentary. This section sketches the
national policy thrusts that resulted, but with some attention to state-level policies.
By “policy” I also include internal conquest of indigenous peoples and foreign policy
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towards black nations, and I refer, too, to access to both prestigious government jobs
and the non-menial ranks of the military, including the officer corps (Kousser 1982).
Consider the antebellum white man’s republic in which all adult white male voters
could vote. We may admire its civic, mobilizing qualities (Burnham 2010,15-51). But
one of its dark sides was the racialized expansion and acquisition of new territory. Policy
responded to the “white median” at the expense of Native Americans (Frymer 2014; for
state-level effects see Bateman 2014a).
Black adult male suffrage after the Civil War also had remarkable policy effects. One
was military recruitment policy, a critical marker of honored civic status (Karlan 2003).
The Buffalo Soldiers who fought Native Americans in the West and policed the Mexican
border served their country during and after the First Reconstruction (1867 to c. 1900)
(Leckie and Leckie 2003). This was America’s first era of mass black adult male voting.
With blacks in the electorate, black combat service seemed to be institutionalized.
Black adult male suffrage influenced foreign policy too. The United States estab
lished diplomatic relations with Haiti during the Civil War and built on that recogni
tion during the First Reconstruction. The United States appointed prominent African
Americans to diplomatically represent the United States. The symbolism was very great;
Haiti is the only nation in world history to emerge from a successful black slave revolt
against a white European power (Teal 2008; Clavin 2010).^
Civil War pensions during the Reconstruction and post-Reconstruction decades pro
tected large numbers of black adult males and their widows in their old age. Yes, local
discretion in the program’s administration meant unfair administration in the 1880s.
But even then there was extensive coverage (Wilson 2010).^
Fast forward to the presidency of Woodrow Wilson. Wilson’s presidency marked
the first instance of unified Democratic control of national government after black
disenfranchisement became fully entrenched. Black disenfranchisement in the exConfederate South (and beyond, including Delaware and Oklahoma) was a process that
played out for over two decades, 1889-1910. In 1915 the Wilson administration abruptly
replaced the African American diplomat in Haiti with an inexperienced white Missouri
Congressman. Wilson then sent in an expeditionary force from the all-white Marine
Corps. The US occupation lasted until 1935 (Plummer 1982; Schmidt 1971).
The cycle of black suffrage politics also altered civil service policy. Wilson system
atically relegated black civil servants to second- and third-class status. The Navy
Department actually required its black civil servants to work behind screens, out ofview
(King 2007; Patler 2004; Weiss 1969). Also, black combat service vanished. On the eve
of World War II, thirty years after the full institution of black Southerners’ disenfran
chisement, the United States had a functionally all-white military (Reddick 1949,18-19;
Leckie 1967; Mershon and Schlossman 1998, ch. 1).
Even as the Democratic party’s commitment to black disenfranchisement recast
policy, governance, and the central state, the constitutional nationalization of women
suffrage in 1920 induced politicians to enact a federal program, the Sheppard-Towner
Maternity and Infancy Act of 1921. Women’s suffrage thus lowered rates of infant
mortality in the 1920s'* (Miller 2008; Moehling and Thomasson 2012). To the extent
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that decades of strategic coalition between suffragists and temperance activists and
prohibitionists helped to set the stage for Prohibition then to that extent the long strug
gle for women suffrage reduced alcohol abuse (Blocker 2006; Paulson 1973).
Meanwhile, black disenfranchisement shaped Congress in ways that would soon
affect the New Deal and its policies. As the Souths one-party regimes became institu
tionalized, they sent national politicians to Washington who worked assiduously to
insulate the South from national democratic norms (Gibson 2012a, b). Long careers in
Congress meant that highly skillful politicians became masters of its norms and proce
dures. They became supporters of such norms as seniority, which gave them access to
valuable committee leadership positions.
These congressional changes had policy consequences through much of the twentieth
century, during and after the New Deal. Black disenfranchisement and the one-party
South regulated the emergence of American social democracy. Southern Democrats’
privileged position in Congress gave them veto power over federal policy. Their struc
tural advantage in shaping legislation and administration meant that New Deal and Fair
Deal social policies helped whites first and blacks second (Katznelson 2005).
Suffrage politics also affects state and local government. Black suffrage politics has
several times recast Southern education finance, teacher-student ratios, and other
determinants of whether schools can do their jobs well. The First Reconstruction
brought public education to the South. Then black disenfranchisement c. 1900 sharply
slowed the rate of progress in educational attainment that the First Reconstruction had
kick-started for black Southerners. Later the confluence of educational desegregation
and the Voting Rights Act of 1965 similarly improved Southern educational outcomes
and processes (Wright 2013).

Collective Action
AND Political Violence
Collective action and suffrage politics have also been tightly meshed. The quests for
black voting rights and women suffrage both created compelling examples of popular
courage and insistence that the American regime live up to its democratic principles.
For instance, toward the end of the long quest for women’s suffrage Alice Paul invented
powerful symbols of female resolve. Taking advantage of the rise of mass circulation
newspapers and photography, Paul invented a protest tactic that is now common,
namely picketing in front of the White House. She also fused the hunger strike and jailin for the first time in the American context (Adams and Keene 2008).
Similarly, black voting rights struggle in the twentieth century featured an Arendtian
display of political courage on behalf of the American regime’s deepest principles.
Freedom Summer 1964 is still etched in national consciousness.^ The civil rights move
ment strategy of arousing public concern outside the South peaked with the events of
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the Selma-to-Montgomery March, pressuring the administration of Lyndon Baines
Johnson to work with Congress in drafting and enacting the 1965 Voting Rights Act
(Garrow 1978; May 2013). The trail of the Selma to Montgomery march of March, 1965 is
today the site of a national park.®
But there has been more—namely, violent reactions from those who resisted demands
for voting rights. The line between collective action and sheer violence was sometimes
very thin. White-on-black election riots broke out in Deep South states from 1874-1876.
Arkansas and Louisiana experienced low-level civil war in these years. In 1920, white
supremacist groups in Florida attacked black voters all around the state as they sought to
make the most of the Nineteenth Amendment. Florida burned just as Mississippi later
burned in 1964 (Ortiz 2005). Pushing for voting rights led to underground conspira
cies against and the assassinations of such black civil rights leaders as Harry T. Moore
in 1951 (Florida) and Medgar Evers in 1963 (Mississippi) (Green 1999)- A full analysis of
election-related intimidation connected to black voter struggle but also to Latino and
Native American voting rights struggle would show that intimidation and violent out
bursts have constantly marked voting rights struggle.

Law and Judicial Politics
All the while there has been a legal dimension to suffrage politics. Formal legal state
ments produced by state legislatures and Congress have ranked among the fundamen
tal prizes of suffrage politics. Forty-nine of fifty state constitutions now explicitly grant
the right to vote. The Article V amendment process inscribed six voting rights amend
ments on the federal Constitution of 1787: the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments
that protect black voting rights, the Nineteenth Amendment that enfranchised women,
the Twenty-third Amendment that brought the District of Columbia into the Electoral
College, the Twenty-fourth Amendment that invalidated the poll tax in federal elections
(another protection for black voters), and the Twenty-sixth Amendment that lowered
the voting age to 18. The law of suffrage either positively defined voter qualifications, as
in the states, or it barred invidious discrimination in the electoral process on the basis of
race, gender, and age, as in the national constitutional amendments.
Law, and by implication state and federal judiciaries, have been basic cornerstones
of America’s suffrage politics. Hence there has been constant litigation to implement
or alter voting rights law. For instance, the legal attacks on, and the defense of, the First
Reconstruction moved into the federal courts immediately. There, federal judges forged
an entire new body of jurisprudential thought (Brandwein 2011). Congress established
the Department of Justice in 1870 in part to deploy government lawyers who would pro
tect black voting rights.
Consider, too, the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund and its struggle
to have the Supreme Court invalidate the Southern Democratic white primary on
the basis of the Fourteenth Amendment. In 1944 that resulted in Smith v. Allwright
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invalidating the white primary. The NAACP then sought to implement the rul
ing, growing rapidly in the South as a result (Johnson 2010; Zelden 2004). The rise
and defense of the Second Reconstruction (from the 1940s into the present) contin
ued to empower activist attorneys in and out of the federal government (Landsberg
2007; McDonald 2003; Parker 1990). Voting rights lawyers are today key players in
suffrage politics.
Although making, interpreting, and mobilizing law have all been central elements of
suffrage politics there is another equally important side: ignoring and evading constitu
tional law. Black disenfranchisement transformed the Fifteenth Amendment into a dead
letter. As disenfranchisement took hold the two parties also ignored the Fourteenth
Amendments constitutionally prescribed cost for disenfranchisement, which is reduc
tion in House representation. By failing to implement Section 2 of the Fourteenth
Amendment, the Republicans and Democrats jointly amended the Constitution de
facto.

Descriptive Representation
Suffrage politics has also recast “descriptive” representation, that is, the extent to which
elected office holders and political parties mirrored the political incorporation of previ
ously excluded Americans. The changes occurred in statewide offices, such as gover
norships, in county commissions and city councils, in state legislatures, in Congress,
and even the presidency, as the election of Barack Obama shows. No Voting Rights
Act of 1965, very likely no African American president. Such changes in who holds
office meant, too, that public officials worked harder for the interests of the previously
dispossessed (Haynie 2001).
But rates of change in office holding were quicker or slower depending on the extent
to which the “supply” of offices were structurally open to newcomers. During the First
Reconstruction African Americans rapidly attained congressional office because the
process of Southern party building added a whole new pool of career ladders and offices
to the Republican party’s existing stock of career tracks (Dray 2008). During the Second
Reconstruction the increase in black office holding in the South sharply differed, since
all offices were held by white Democrats. Black office holding since 1965 has required
continuous judicial and congressional intervention and regulation.
The office-holding impact of women suffrage also took longer than the case of the
First Reconstruction in part because the expansion of the Union, and of the party sys
tem, roughly reached its territorial limit and final organizational form just as women
gained the suffrage. New career tracks were not there for the many thousands of women
suffrage activists. Women candidates have been fighting their way into the two major
parties ever since. Only now, nearly a century after the Nineteenth Amendment, is a
female presidency clearly in the historical cards.
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Federalism
Finally, voting rights politics has always interacted with federalism. Under the
Constitution, Article i. Section 4, the states establish voter eligibility. States moved
roughly in step when they expanded white adult male suffrage, but later their suffrage
policies diverged, as the struggles for black and women’s suffrage show. Suffrage politics
also created national standards, including constitutional amendments, that constrain
the states. All of these national standards have expanded voter eligibility and widened
the boundaries of the electorate. When states were forced to respond to them then “ter
ritorial democratization” occurred. By the same token, when and as states have evaded
these national standards, particularly black suffrage, subnational restriction of democ
racy’s boundaries occurred (Gibson 20i2a,b).

Who Governs Suffrage Politics?
My overview of suffrage politics, tracing its robust connections to policy effects,
collective action, law, representation, and federalism, of course raises a central
issue: who or what decisively influences suffrage politics? Have all the various prin
cipals in suffrage politics been equally influential? Or have some actors and institu
tions been especially consequential, for example, the Supreme Court (if one adopts a
state-centered approach) or social movements (if one takes a society-centered view)?
Alternatively, has the entire cast of characters instead responded to broad pressures
that were unrelated to suffrage politics, such as war-time periods that dramatized the
gaps between suffrage rights and military conscription and obligation (Karlan 2003:
Klinkner and Smith 1999)?
To be clear, the answer should illuminate three basic shifts. Sometimes suffrage pol
itics hinged on the extension of voting rights to include new categories of citizens or
immigrants. Other times suffrage politics restricted the electorate in a large number of
states and locales, either blocking voters from coming in or pushing them out. Yet other
times suffrage politics has featured inaction or “political drift” despite increases in the
number of citizens who could be enfranchised.
“Political drift” refers to changes in the effects of one kind of policy, such as the dis
enfranchisement of ex-felons, from a major policy change elsewhere in the policy land
scape, such as sharp increase in rates of incarceration. One can see such “political drift”
today in the United States as the felony disenfranchisement provisions of states interact
with the rise of the “carceral state.”^ Millions of ex-felons are disenfranchised and could
be brought into the electorate. Instead they gather as a reserve army of potential voters,
the size of the army varying by state. State-level politicians are generally loath to bring
them into voting (Katzenstein et al. 2010).
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Restating the question: who or what has been particularly and regularly instrumental
in “extending,” “restricting,” or “doing little” about voting rights?
In thinking about this I have turned to E. E. Schattschneider. He pictured party politi
cians as the rulers of voting rights. He pointed us away from such actors as presidents or
social movements, for he believed that “Americans ... have a hopelessly romantic view
of the history of democracy...” (Schattschneider i960,100-101).
Economic historians and comparativists would be struck by how Schattschneider
also bracketed social forces. Schattschneider baldly asserted that “[s]omewhere along
the line the antidemocratic forces simply abandoned the field.” Adam Przeworski, in
a test of several economic historical models highlighting conflict between elites and
masses, has proposed in stark contrast that resistance to suffrage extension by Western
economic and political elites was a major force in regulating suffrage. Insurrectionary
threat and mass collective action usually moved those at the top to extend suffrage
rights. Party politics, he found, was a major factor only in the second great wave of suf
frage extensions, the extension of female suffrage. As he succinctly puts it, the working
classes conquered the suffrage while women were granted the suffrage by vote-seeking
parties (Przeworski 2009).
Yet the lack of regime-threatening working-class insurrections in American politi
cal development recommends that we break from what Przeworski and most compara
tivists emphasize. A basic developmental fact about the United States is the very early
emergence of mass competitive party politics. Because mass political parties emerged
alongside mass voting rights a large class of professional politicians became early stake
holders in how the process subsequently evolved.
By building on Schattschneider s explicit emphasis on party politicians I outline a
party-centered understanding of American suffrage politics (see also McConnaughy
2013; Valelly 2004,1996,1993). By “party-centered” I do not mean an instrumentalist
view of politicians’ motivations, as if their engagement with suffrage politics was coolly
rational or often insincere. For one thing politicians interacted with social forces, expos
ing them to passionately held beliefs and claims. Schattschneider was proudly reduc
tionist, claiming that “[t]he newly enfranchised had about as much to do with the
extension of the suffrage as the consuming public has had to do with the expanding
market for toothpaste” (Schattschneider i960,101). This ruled out proper appreciation
of the interactions between parties and movements. Social forces and social movements
mattered greatly. They set party agendas through protest, lobbied elected officials, and
served as allies in mobilizing voters, or, often enough, drove the voters of another party
away from the polls.
Party politicians also innovatively forged or freely borrowed ideas about what the
right to vote means and who should properly have it. One tradition of thought treated
the right to vote as a natural right. But a rival tradition instead regarded it as a policy mat
ter, properly connected to a sense of prudence about who should have the right. Voter
eligibility was a policy decision meant to reinforce the integrity of the regime (Keyssar
2009). Rogers Smith has demonstrated, as well, that invidious civic ideals repeatedly
influenced suffrage rights, as politicians drew color, gender, religious, and ethnic lines
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for allocating the right to vote (Smith 1997)- On the other hand, a third and contrasting
ideational element came from the impact of war. Wars promoted new (albeit gendered)
ideas about rights because they opened up military service for marginalized or disen
franchised African, Asian, Hispanic, and Native American men. Their warrior citizen
ship in turn earned them social respect and led to calls for enfranchisement (Karlan
2003; Mayhew 2008, ch. 12). Politicians operated, in short, with complex civic ideals.
Finally, party politicians wrote new constitutional and election law. They also changed
the structure of the federal and state court systems and they had judicial recruitment
strategies for entrenching their legal innovations. But such actions of course simulta
neously opened parties up to being constrained by the subsequent decisions of judges
and the strategies of election lawyers. The relative autonomy of law meant that parties
were not guaranteed any particular jurisprudence or statutory construction, only broad
outlines for voting rights. To put the point differently, a party-centered view is not a
“party-dominant” view.

Competitive Enfranchisement
Nonetheless, party politicians have governed party politics, and the best way to see that
is to trace key logics of enfranchisement in American political development. The first of
these is competitive enfranchisement. In The Semisovereign People Schattschneider pro
posed that:
[t]he struggle for the ballot was a by-product of the system of party conflict. The rise
of the party system led to a competitive expansion of the market for politics ... The
parties... were the entrepreneurs, took the initiative, and got the law of the franchise
liberalized... one of the best ways to win a fight is to widen the scope of the conflict,
and the effort to widen the involvement of the more or less innocent bystanders pro
duced universal suffrage (Schattschneider i960, loo-ioi).
The idea here was that political parties primed the pump of their rivalries by regularly
enlarging and mutually dividing the electorate.
Are there historical eras that fit Schattschneider’s thesis of competitive enfranchise
ment? The strongest matches are the suffrage extensions between the Founding and the
Civil War.® But the precise sequence very much differs from Schattschneider’s account.
The parties did not single-handedly generate mass suffrage rights. Instead the process
was much more interactive. Mass voting preceded, and also stimulated, the formation of
stable, internally disciplined party organizations during and after the rise of Jacksonian
party politics.
A new dataset built by Philip Lampi of the American Antiquarian Society from the
Founding to 1824 shows that the franchise was far more generous in the early republic
than is commonly known. Women had the vote in several states, and so did African
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Americans, who voted for the Federalists. Turnout could reach 70 percent in some
states, for instance Massachusetts, North Carolina, and New Hampshire. Voting was
continuous and constant since there was no regular election day or calendar, only a suc
cession of elections. Walter Dean Burnham has characterized the findings produced by
Lampi’s dataset, A New Nation Votes, as akin to encountering a “lost Atlantis.”®
The subsequent creation of a stable competitive party system built on the early parti
san differentiation of national pohtics in Congress and the states. It also built on, and it
reordered, this great democratic legacy from the early republic (Ratcliffe 2013). Parties
forged a national electoral calendar and effectively founded the Electoral College.
Parties also continued to liberalize voter qualifications, to use Schattschneider’s lan
guage. Eligible voter turnout climbed to even higher levels across all states, far higher
than today’s turnout levels for voter eligibles.

The Calculus of Suffrage Politics
The antebellum process of competitive enfranchisement underscores that party politi
cians quickly learned how to expand the electorate. But competitive enfranchisement
has hardly been the only way in which party politicians have governed American suf
frage politics. There have been other forms of party intervention into suffrage politics.
Those forms are related to the calculus of suffrage politics, for suffrage extension can
have costs as well as benefits for political parties (McConnaughy 2013,19-48). Significant
suffrage expansions can create new policy tasks for parties that they did not previously
have. Any really large number of additional voters can render existing policy outputs
and existing political careers less certain. Suffrage politics can therefore split parties
between those who are inspired by it (or who see how it can help a party) and those who
are less certain or disinclined to disturb existing institutions.
Imagine what immediately enfranchising all the undocumented immigrants in the
United States might do. Established issues and interests which once did not face com
petition for scarce legislative time and as foci of public debate now would face such
competition (Tienda 2002). Similarly, rapid and thorough reform of ex-felon disen
franchisement would recast contemporary political representation. If ex-felons came
into the electorate en masse there would be a political potential for a very different
approach to punishment and incarceration than what we currently have in the United
States. Prison-to-work policies might become an issue. Party politicians would be crosspressured by constituencies with an interest in the status quo, such as corporations that
provide correctional services and their employees and service providers, and a quest to
dismantle the “carceral state.”
The developmental implication of such counterfactual observations is this; after the
first great waves of competitive suffrage expansion, from the Founding to the Civil
War, any subsequent extensions would likely be slower and possibly quite difficult. The
historical record bears this out. Later suffrage extensions required either one party or
both parties, or dominant factions in the major parties allying with (or even forming)
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third parties/® to address new issues, adopt new and very controversial civic ideals, and
represent new interests. As the advent of black suffrage showed, the differences between
the existing electorates preferences and the enlarged electorates preferences could be
varied and stark. Politicians also needed to make room for office-seeking newcomers
who were not white men.
Party politicians therefore had to want more suffrage, and also to resolve any factional
disagreements among themselves about what suffrage extension would do to their par
ties. The mix of costs and benefits required intrapartisan assessment, often in a series of
discussions across time. Much of that sort of assessment can be recovered from legisla
tive or congressional debates and roll calls, from newspaper debates, and from corre
spondence in archives. When discussions are recoverable they feature a mix of forecasts,
deep uncertainty, and sincere views about political rights.

Strategic and Programmatic
Enfranchisement
With these considerations in mind we can turn to two other dynamics: strategic and
programmatic enfranchisement. In addition to co-production ofjointly shared electoral

markets, political parties have chosen other courses of action. One has been strategic
enfranchisement, that is, building and adding a new electorate entirely for one party and
not the other.
Strategic enfranchisement on a truly grand scale occurred just once in American
political development. But it resembled an electoral supernova. In December 1866, the
national percentage of black adult males eligible to vote in the United States was a tiny
0.5 percent. Only twelve months later, after Congress enacted the Reconstruction Acts,
the percentage was 80 points higher, at 80.5 percent.
The congressional Republican Party acted forcefully because it was in mortal danger.
Black enfranchisement was in no sense a joint, cross-party venture. Republicans needed
to rescue their political future from President Andrew Johnsons remarkably bold strat
egy to permanently marginalize Republicans.
Johnson’s plan for bringing Southern states back into the Union amounted to preemp
tively blocking any black enfranchisement in the ex-Confederate states. It would guar
antee a resurrection of the Democratic party as a potent cross-sectional party dedicated
to white supremacy. Republicans, who had just fought a civil war for a new birth of free
dom, would be cordoned off in the North, consigned to merely regional strength. This
existential threat led Republicans to launch direct military registration of black adult
male voters in the ex-Confederacy.

Mass collective action in the South cemented the revolution of 1867 as black
Southerners made Republican suffrage extension work on the ground. Enfranchised
black voters steadfastly ignored local white hostility, travelling in groups to register
and vote, sometimes armed. Black Southerners believed in their shared fate as a new
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electorate. Republicans and African Americans’ networks of political clubs, reinforced
by community and familial pressures to vote, sustained that belief (Valelly 2004, ch. 2;
Hahn 2004, ch. 4).
.
. ,,
Strategic enfranchisement was fundamentally a vote-getting project by om party,
undertaken by its politicians as they evaluated the alternative of standing still. Ue costs
of inaction were enormous; the gains, while initially uncertain, were a reprieve from t e
plain threat of being put out of business. In other words, black suffrage politics in t is
Le had a sharp, clear calculus of costs and benefits, and the calculus pointed toward
unprecedented activism and a burst of policymaking.
Women suffrage also had a calculus, but its pace differed and saw more uncertainty
and factionalism. The process was accordingly extended and incremental. Corrine
McConnaughy dubs it programmatic enfranchisement, underscoring how suffrage
joined the existing policy portfolios (or programs) of established partisan actors.
Politicians in state legislatures and women suffrage activists, recognized that women
suffrage would not award a large new voter bloc to one party at the expense of the other.
They indeed assumed that women would split their votes. But they also understood that
women had specific policy demands, such as temperance reform. Temperance reform in
particular complicated the management of existing coalitions (Andersen 2013). S^^rage
expansion therefore became a divisive demand in state after state. It acquired a different
logic than either competitive or strategic enfranchisement.

Factions of established party politicians who were indifferent or hostile to women suf
frage resisted, but eventually they accommodated, other politicians who were not mdi ferent Those proponents of women suffrage were either third-party state legislators or
major party legislators affiliated with groups that endorsed suffrage on its merits, such as
the Grange. Majorities for suffrage emerged in state legislatures when the resisters con
cluded that there were no losses from suffrage expansion for the larger party coalitions
and their ties to brewers, distillers, distributors, tavern owners,-i.e., the entire liquor
industrial complex. That took time; suffrage expansion required repeated interactions
across several electoral cycles to clarify the costs and benefits to the parties. Women su frage activists were certainly necessary to the process as persistent agenda-setters. But
they could not, on their own, induce the competitive enfranchisement that had earlier
driven white adult male suffrage.

Suffrage Regimes
AND Reactive Sequences
Suffrage politics clearly interacts with social divisions; class, race, and gender (and
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ethnicity, as we see later.) In doing so can suffrage politics
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gains the loyalty of a social group or pushes out a group to entrench itself; another party
either loses or openly concedes that groups votes.
Sharp interparty conflict erupts if the losing party promotes backlash or even elec
toral violence as Southern Democrats did during the First Reconstruction. But to the
enfranchisers the polarization is worth it. They not only gain more voters but they also
acquire additional cohorts of legislators whose right to office is underwritten by a new
voter bloc. Moreover if strategic enfranchisers can gain continuous unified control of
the national government they can achieve other policy goals.
Enfranchisers accordingly protect the enfranchisement process, legislatively and in
the courts. Strategic enfranchisement has a second stage—the subsequent creation of
new institutions, election laws, and jurisprudence. Strategic enfranchisement thus
acquires resilience and durability even as it institutionalizes conflict. The ongoing col
lective action among the enfranchised (as they make enfranchisement work on the
ground and defend it through high rates of voting) also strongly reinforces these prop
erties of the suffrage regime.
What do the losers do? They batter the walls of a regime, over and over, or seek to
circumvent its boundaries. Strategic (dis)enfranchisement engenders a “reactive
sequence.” James Mahoney aptly defines it as a kind of path dependent politics:
Whereas self-reinforcing sequences are characterized by processes of reproduction
that reinforce early events, reactive sequences are marked by backlash processes that
transform and perhaps reverse early events. In a reactive sequence, early events trigger
subsequent development not by reproducing a given pattern, but by setting in motion
a chain of tightly linked reactions and counterreactions. (Mahoney 2000,526-527)
In this vein, let us look again at the struggle for women suffrage. In 1866 and 1867 black
and white female suffrage activists worked feverishly to promote their joint causes and
prod Republicans to embrace them both. But the Republican party’s move to establish
black adult male, but not female, suffrage split the coalition (Dudden 2011). A policy
window that had briefly opened then abruptly closed. Women suffrage leaders now
squarely confronted the many and deep connections between patriarchy and party poli
tics that dated to the early republic. The response from women suffragists? Hard work
over many decades. It took two forms: movement building and a two-pronged strategy
of seeking both state-level suffrage extensions and an amendment to the Constitution
(Kyvig 1996,27-239; McCammon 2001).
The great suffrage leader Carrie Chapman Catt and her colleague Nettie Rogers
Shuler, a staff officer of the National American Women Suffrage Association (NAWSA),
summarized the results in 1923:^^
To get the word male in effect out of the Constitution cost the women of this country
fifty-two years of pauseless campaign ... they were forced to conduct fifty-six state
referenda campaigns to male voters; 480 campaigns to get Legislatures to submit suf
frage amendments to voters; 47 campaigns to get State constitutional conventions to
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write woman suffrage into State constitutions; 277 campaigns to get State party con
ventions to include woman suffrage planks; 30 campaigns to get presidential party
conventions to adopt woman suffrage planks in party platforms; and 19 campaigns
with 19 successive Congresses ... It was a continuous and seemingly endless chain of
activity (Catt and Shuler 1923,106-107).
Yet as late as 1904 there was little to show for the “pauseless campaign. In the words of
one unfriendly commentator:
Of the forty-five states in the Union, twenty do not give women any form of ballot;
twenty give them the lightly-regarded school ballot or the still less important and
infrequently exercised ... ballot... on questions submitted to taxpayers; one admits
them to municipal suffrage, but refrises them anything more; and four give them the
full ballot (Paulson 1973.141) •
World War I suddenly opened another policy window. Alice Paul, the great mili
tant suffragist, coordinated a series of daring protests in Washington, DC, that prod
ded President Woodrow Wilson and Congress into action on behalf of the Nineteenth
Amendment despite internal party resistance from Southern Democrats (Lunardini and
Knock 1980; Zahniser and Fry 2014). The result roughly doubled the size of the national
electorate (Corder and Wolbrecht 2006). Ifre “endless chain of activity” finally paid off.
But the struggle, over the entire course of the “reactive sequence,” took a very long time
and for a time it even appeared futile.
Consider another such sequence; black suffrage restriction after the First Reconstru^on.
That was not easy either. The Southern Democratic movement to strategically disenfran
chise black adult male Southerners was arduous and drawn-out, its own kind of pause
less campaign.” Those who wished to scale back or reverse the strategic enfranchisement by
Republicans were forced to fight for decades.

.

u •

m

u

Contrary to conventional wisdom there was no massive and sudden switch in black
Southerners’ civic status coinciding with the Compromise of 1877. Most believe that a
backlash in Northern and Southern white opinion sapped Republican commitment to
the First Reconstruction. Hence the dramatic interparty agreement in early 1877 to sus
pend what Democrats and a faction of Republicans detested, i.e. federal military super
vision of elections and the armed protection of beleaguered Republican governors and
legislatures. Southern Democrats piously but falsely promised to honor black voting
rights. In return, the story goes, Rutherford B. Hayes took the presidency. Rapid demo
cratic collapse in the South and a massive shift toward one-party rule happened next
(McConnell 1994)In reality the contraction of black voting and office holding resembled a war of attri
tion, not a war of maneuver. Like all such wars its outcome was hardly a foregone con
clusion. The suffrage regime of the First Reconstruction was after all a political order,
not the empty exercise in futility that countless commentators have alleged it to be. And
African American voters and activists hardly considered it a lost cause.
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White and black Republicans built an integrated ensemble of parties-in-theelectorate, parties-in-government, and parties-as-organizations. Pulling that off was
supremely difficult. Nonetheless the effort succeeded more than is commonly recog
nized (Valelly 2004, chs. 2-5; Powell 2006).
Besides such party-building, jurisprudence-building also laid the foundations of the
First Reconstruction. Jurisprudence-building refers to continuously favorable constitu
tional and statutory construction of new suffrage law. Its elements were recruitment to
the Supreme Court, judicial vision, and craftsmanship both at the levels of the Court
and the federal judiciary, and the relative strength (numerically and in terms of talent)
of an advocacy coalition of government and private voting rights lawyers. The resilience
of a suffrage regime thus also rested on jurisprudence-building. Indeed the longer the
judicial reinforcement then the sturdier a suffrage regime, and the more likely that its
opponents would either accept the regime or despair of dismantling it.
During the First Reconstruction party-building and jurisprudence-building were
stronger processes than is generally known. Moreover, as Democrats chipped away at
the suffrage regime through violence and fraud. Northern Republicans found a reason
to actually rebuild the suffrage regime. Republicans worried that if they did not restore
eroding black voting rights then Southern Democrats would keep grabbing more seats
in the House than they deserved. The Republicans response was a little-known but dar
ing policy proposal, the Federal Elections Bill of 1890. The Federal Elections Bill tar
geted the South and placed House elections under federal judicial supervision (Valelly
2009). It meant to reconstruct the Reconstruction.
When Northern Republicans finally acquiesced to black Southerners’ disenfran
chisement, after the failure of the Federal Elections Bill, they did so in part because their
party’s strength surged in the North and, critically, in Western states that had recently
joined the Union. Republicans added not just voters to their ranks but they also added
office holders. These changes compensated for Southern losses in House seats (Valelly
2004, ch. 6). Besides, revisiting the Federal Elections Bill hardly made sense. In 1893 and
1894, Democrats repealed most of the statutes that enabled the First Reconstruction. The
political costs of any new Republican statutory intervention were far higher as a result.
The calculus ofblack suffrage politics was now fundamentally different for Republicans.
The result was Republican inaction, and on the ground black Southerners paid a terrible
cost (Valelly 1995).
As Southern Democrats grasped that there would be no new intrusion into the region
they moved away from episodic violence and fraud toward institutionalization of their
victory. The Australian ballot punished illiteracy both among whites and blacks. The
poll tax, literacy tests, good understanding tests, criminal disenfranchisement, and
grandfather clauses also whitened the Southern electorate. The Democratic white pri
mary emerged as the de facto general election. Its diffusion and elaboration completed
the segregation of African Americans from electoral politics. On top of these measures
were such structural changes as at-large elections and the conversion of elected offices to
appointment.

460

RICHARD M. VALELLY

Black disenfranchisement now rested on a powerfully interlocking system. It reduced
black voting and black elected office-holding in the ex-Confederacy to approximately
zero. A small number of black United States postmasters and collectors of internal rev
enue retained their positions (though one postmaster was lynched in South Carolina).
Some black voters remained on the registration rolls, and tokenistic voting by a hand
ful of community leaders was permitted in many places. Otherwise there was no black
presence in public and official life in the ex-Confederacy.
Ihe lesson here is that it takes a long time to kill off a voting rights order. Biracial
democracy immediately faced sharp challenges, yes. But the white supremacist cam
paign to kill it succeeded only when multiple and reinforcing institutional changes were
invented, consciously connected to each other, and in the end left unchallenged by the
Republican party.
This brings us to yet another extraordinary case of a deeply resilient voting rights
order. As Southern Democrats obliterated the First Reconstruction’s suffrage regime
they built an equally (indeed more) robust substitute for it. The substance of the Jim
Crow voting rights order differed. The First Reconstruction was democratic and inclu
sive; its successor was anti-democratic and exclusionary. The South featured one-party
autocracies that resemble other one-party autocracies outside the United States (Gibson
2012a, b; Mickey 2015; for a partial dissent from this perspective see Caughey 2012).
How could democracy be restored? The new order’s combination of authoritarianism
and ingenious institutional design created very deep political dilemmas for those who
opposed it (Carle 2013; Norrell 2009). Their responses—ffieir reactive sequence—played
out over many decades (Jenkins, Weaver, and Peck 2010). They included the Great
Migrations from the South and the Garveyism that spread rapidly in the South just after
disenfranchisement reached its completion around 1907 (Rolinson 2007; Tolnay 2003).
And they also featured not just “exit” and internal exile but also “voice,” through the for
mation of the NAACP, the several civil rights movements of the late 1940s, the 1950s, and
1960s, the Voter Education Project that implemented the 1965 Voting Rights Act, and,
not least, the countless local, inch-by-inch struggles in Deep South states (Dittmer 1995;
Hirschman 1970; McAdam 1982; Thornton 2002).
By the mid-1960s, the Jim Crow order faced truly massive challenge. Official and
extra-legal violence erupted; it was targeted against black and white activists who con
fronted this order. Think here of Birmingham, 1963, Mississippi, 1964, and Selma, 1965.
Recent treatments of the civil rights movements have correctly uncovered a secret his
tory of precautionary armed self-defense (Cobb 2014).^^
The dominant legacy of the voting rights struggle was political courage. Freedom
Summer, 1964 was one of the greatest freedom struggles in American history. The drama
of the Selma-to-Montgomery March in March, 1965 was so gripping that it decisively
pressured the president and Congress to move quickly and to draft a comprehensive
voting rights statute, the 1965 Voting Rights Act.
African American voter registration then rose as voting rights organizations imple
mented the Voting Rights Act on the ground and movement lawyers pressed the
Supreme Court to back the Act. Within three decades of this surge, i.e., during the
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1990s, African American office holding in the South in state legislatures and US House
delegations finally reached a fairly normal footing (Bullock and Caddie 2009). In the
twenty-first-century South black and white voter turnout levels began to converge.
Notice the critical datum here; it took literally a century to undo the Jim Crow order.
Like the other suffrage regimes that I have described the Jim Crow suffrage regime was
resilient because of its interlocking institutions. In all three cases, in fact, i.e. the biracial order of the First Reconstruction, the gendered party politics that was sharply and
unexpectedly reinforced by the Republican party’s decision after the Civil War to block
woman suffrage, and the Jim Crow suffrage regime, a “pauseless campaign” was neces
sary to alter or dismantle the voting rights order and install a new one.
To sum up, suffrage regimes will create backlash, a reactive sequence, to the extent that
they allocate clear partisan and social gains and losses. This is particularly likely for stra
tegic enfranchisement and strategic disenfranchisement. Anticipating or responding to
such backlash, those who build them will seek to institutionalize and entrench the regimes.
Thus the pohtics of substituting a new order with different purposes can extend for a very
long period of time. Suffrage politics, if it is zero-sum for the major parties, or for very large
groups, or for both, can introduce deep and persistent axes of conflict beyond those that
already exist in American politics. Sometimes the conflict can be connected to expand
ing the boundaries of democracy; other times, as with the campaign against black voting
rights, those who launch and sustain the reactive sequence aim to sharply limit democracy.

The Exceptionalism of American
Suffrage Politics
By now the reader might suspect that America’s suffrage politics has made America very
unusual, different from other Western democracies and their suffrage experiences. The
reader would be right.
That American suffrage politics was sui generis seemed obvious to international
observers from the start. The first major suffrage extension, the rise of mass voting just
after the Founding, struck Alexis de Tocqueville as extraordinary, a new kind of poli
tics that held an important key to human history. It amazed him that propertied elites
quickly moved to share political power with the propertyless. He attributed this shift
to the transformative power of democratic ideas (Tocqueville 2000, 54-55)- Economic
inequality did not block or subvert political equality.
Was Tocqueville right? The analytic issues here become tricky and complex. By 1900
adult male turnout dropped sharply. The barons and bosses of the Gilded Age became
deeply afraid of the lower orders and there is lots of evidence in the form of speeches, let
ters, and political essays that reveal their fear of universal suffrage.
If Gilded Age elites killed popular participation then much of American suffrage
politics fundamentally resembles its counterparts in the Western and Latin American
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democracies. The late nineteenth-century outcome in the United States differs, constric
tion not expansion. But the players are the same, if in a different configuration: the rich,
in city mansions and rural bastions, joined hands with a reformist middle class, stream
ing out from colleges and universities, all alarmed by electoral “corruption and strong
political parties. Together they tamed both a restive working class, much of it populated
by immigrants, and insurgent farmers angry about how finance squeezed them. Even as
suffrage rights expanded elsewhere in the Western world, in response to the rise of labor
parties, electoral participation dropped on this side of the Atlantic and the Equator.
The reform project here was both institutional and indirect. It focused on depriving
parties of candidate recruitment (through the direct primary), on whether parties had
an advantage in legislative agenda setting (via the referendum), personal registration on
work days in the name of fighting (non-existent) fraud, the secret ballot (rewarding
literacy and knowledge of English), the establishment of non-partisan voting for many
municipal positions and some state legislatures, and the abolition of the fusion ballots
that helped candidates from agrarian and labor third parties. Alien declarant suffrage,
which facilitated the participation of working-class immigrants, also shut down in state
after state. The establishment of a one-party monopoly in the South made the region
hostile to any independent organizations (such as tenant and labor unions) that spoke
for poor whites and that might unite blacks and whites on class lines.
New electoral institutions, the intentional disorganization of the parties, and organ
ized shifts in party system structure all weakened lower-class electoral influence. Such
indirect but nonetheless strategic disenfranchisement made political democracy safer
for the middle class and for wealth inequality (Ahmed 2013: Beckert 2003; Cunningham
1991; Keyssar 2009, ch. 5; Richardson 2006; Testi 1998)Yet an alternative line of scholarship argues that political parties, not frightened elites,
actually mediated these rules changes of the late nineteenth and early twentieth cen
turies. Legislatures, county governments, and city councils processed the great burst
of electoral reforms that occurred. Party politicians controlled these institutions. They
carefully adapted new rules for partisan ends, seeing opportunities to modernize their
organizations, to regularize candidate recruitment, to disadvantage their opponents if
possible, and to find roughly fair solutions to joint organizational needs. Responding
to and solving elite and middle-class fears about the masses were distinctly secondary
(Argersinger 1989,1992; Reynolds 1993: Ware 2002).
There are other problems with the indirect subversion of democracy story. If elites
were weakening democracy then why did woman suffrage succeed? In 1920 the
Nineteenth Amendment roughly doubled the eligible electorate-and helped to expand
the size of government (Lott and Kenny 1999)- Why could the Socialist Party emerge
and grow in strength during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries if the rules
were rigged against the influence of radical workers and farmers? Why did Southern
Democrats adopt broad regulatory and progressive reforms at the national level
(Sanders 1999)?
Class tensions were very real. The scholarship that emphasizes fear of farmers and
workers among the rich (and public intellectuals) certainly unearths candid discussions
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about how best to regulate the suffrage. Nonetheless, Tocqueville’s basic insight, i.e., that
links between economic and political status operate differently in the United States, is
borne out by a balanced assessment of the Gilded Age.
What about racial, gender, and ethnic divisions? Are they also implicated in the
exceptionalism of American suffrage politics and if so how? Here, too, the case for
uniqueness is robust, in fact, stronger.
The key to grasping American distinctiveness on the race and gender dimensions
is fully appreciating the unprecedented marriage of slavery and political democ
racy. This is the only such conjuncture in Western history. Suffrage expansion from
the Founding to the Civil War brought in the lower orders on a mass scale. But it did
not bring in the most subaltern population in the United States: enslaved African
Americans. The United States created mass suffrage amidst mass enslavement.
Yet free African American agitation for black suffrage, both for its own sake and to
subvert slavery, prefigured a far different democracy. Such campaigning in the free
states and in the territories was constant and pervasive in antebellum American politics
(Bateman 2014b; Budros 2013; Walton et al. 2012). There is no counterpart to this record
of collective action in any of the other slave societies of the New World precisely because
all of the others lacked competitive democratic party politics and freedom of association
for free people of color (but see Horton 1999).
The full potential of these little-known struggles emerged after the Civil War. Mass
black suffrage after the Civil War, led by the Republican party and black suffrage activ
ists, realized the reconstructive possibilities of political democracy far more than most
Americans appreciate. This expansion of democracy assured the emancipation of a vast,
enslaved working class. It is the only case of black emancipation and abolition in world
history that featured immediate black adult male enfranchisement and mobilization
into competitive party politics (Kolchin 2012). There is no equivalent in any other post
emancipation society, not Brazil, Cuba, Jamaica, Russia, or others. Black civil rights, suf
frage, and competitive mass party politics rapidly spread in the region that had hosted
slavery. Edward Gibson writes that “the United States experienced... the most extensive
case of territorial democratization in history” (Gibson 2012a, b, 35).
Armed with political and civil rights and represented at all levels by the Republican
party, black Southerners blocked labor peonage (Saville 1994; Schweninger 1990; but
see also Blackmon 2008 and Cohen 1991). Their new civic status sealed the massive
reallocation of wealth that emancipation and the Thirteenth Amendment inaugu
rated. Again we see exceptionalism. There is no other case of suffrage extension being
so sharply and immediately redistributive in a major Western economy. On the eve of
the Civil War the property value of enslaved African Americans was about $10 trillion
(Levine 2013). Reconstruction guaranteed that nothing like the entire value would ever
be recovered.^^
But there is yet more singularity to recognize. Republicans thwarted the full implica
tions of the antebellum black/female coalition by smothering female suffrage. The cost
to democracy’s future was considerable. Black suffrage without female suffrage split
the vision and eloquence of such key figures as Elizabeth Cady Stanton from the cause

464

RICHARD M. VALELLY

of African American civil and political rights. Frederick Douglass drifted away from
the women suffrage cause. Women activists now had to figure out how to set the party
system agenda. Some Republicans, such as George Frisbie Hoar (R-MA) and Thomas
Brackett Reed (R-ME), supported them. But most did not.
No other women’s suffrage movement in Western history, none at all, has
therefore been waged as a clear counterpoint to the politics of black voting and
civil rights (Dudden 2011). The quest for women’s inclusion acquired a uniquely
tragic dimension when it became partly associated with black disenfranchise
ment. Those who opposed the First Reconstruction, i.e., women suffragists and
white supremacist Democrats, made more common cause than is generally known
(Spruill 1995).
Black disenfranchisement c. 1900 was exceptional too. It has no analogue in world
history in terms of its scope and impact. No other political democracy has brought so
many people in for such a long period of time and across such a wide swath of jurisdic
tions, and then, in effect, later tolerated their complete extrusion from their once central
place in the world’s first biracial republic (Valelly 2004).
A complete tally of disenfranchisements in democracies or partial democracies
is not available, to be sure. Scholars are only now investigating such disenfranchise
ments (Bartolini 2000, 206-220; Muhlberger 1999). Black disenfranchisement c.
1900 nonetheless stands out. Recall, after all, that disenfranchisement pushed once
high rates of black office-holding and voting in the ex-Confederacy to about zero.
Nor can one find any other longstanding democracy that experienced such a clear
repeat of an earlier epoch-making suffrage expansion, i.e., the Second Reconstruction.
Armed with the 1965 Voting Rights Act the federal government directly registered black
Southerners in the Deep South in 1965 and 1966. The last time it did this was in 1867.
The entrenchment of the Second Reconstruction since the heady 1960s restores the First
Reconstruction’s biracialism and, as in the First Reconstruction, it makes biracialism a
central dynamic of national politics (Tesler and Sears 2010; Goldman and Mutz 2014).
Surveying the development of voting rights politics from the early nineteenth cen
tury into the present one sees not just the marvel that Schattschneider identified (and
that Tocqueville crossed the Atlantic to study), namely the precocious creation of a
mass electorate and competitive party politics despite great inequalities of wealth. That
achievement was more distinctive than they recognized. It married the world’s most
expansive political democracy and the world’s largest system of black slavery. That
tension-filled marriage set in motion several unique patterns of suffrage politics that
have no exact parallels anywhere else.

Suffrage Politics Today
Well into the third century of the Constitution of 1787 the right to vote divides parties
and polarizes Americans. To be sure, most Americans hardly vote in a mood of high
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rights consciousness. Our models of voting typically frame the act as an individual
calculus of costs, incentives, and benefits, weighted by a sense of duty or obligation to
co-workers, friends, and neighbors, and other social networks (Riker and Ordeshook
1968; Rosenstone and Hansen 2002).
Nonetheless citizen awareness of the current crisis of the Voting Rights Act, and of
election controversies more generally, is fairly high. In 2009, a Pew Research Center sur
vey said that about 57 percent of the public thought that Supreme Court consideration
of “election and voting rules” was personally “very important.”^^ In early June, 2013, the
week before the Court issued the holding in Shelby v. Holder, the New York Times found
that about 75 percent of African Americans consider the Voting Rights Act a necessity.
These levels of awareness may persist today.^®
Many expert observers also question the merits of voter ID legislation. They regard
it as a policy in search of a non-existent problem, for in-person voter impersonation
is extremely rare. Voter ID places the burden of acquiring documentary proof of voter
eligibility on individuals. Some people, students, the elderly, and minorities who do not
own cars, bear the burden more heavily (Hasen 2012; Minnite 2010; Wang 2012).
The jury is still out on the size of voter ID’s real effects at the margin. They have been
slight so far. But friction between the Second Reconstruction and the politics of voter
ID is not only a new feature of American politics but also maps onto partisan and racial
division. Most voter ID legislation does not overtly target by race (Hasen 2014). Yet all of
it does that de facto (Bentele and O’Brien 2013).
Beyond these dynamics lies a clearly anti-democratic phenomenon: felony disenfran
chisement. It shrinks the size of the eligible electorate by nearly 6 million potential vot
ers and disproportionately affects African Americans, who make up about 37 percent
of the population of disenfranchised ex-felons (Manza and Uggen 2004). Among the
democracies only the United States disenfranchises ex-felons so thoroughly. This, too,
shows how unusual American suffrage politics is.
Native American voting rights are also contested. In the Mountain West Native
Americans have encountered open white hostility in recent years as they have sought to
participate in non-tribal local, state, and federal elections. Many whites have regarded
that entry into non-tribal politics as illegitimate. The Native American right to vote is far
from fully realized (Karlan 2011; McDonald 2010).
Since its enactment the Voting Rights Act has authorized the Department of Justice
to deploy thousands of federal elections observers.*^ In part this has been done to pro
tect voting rights for Latinos, Puerto Ricans, Native Americans, and Asian Americans.
Demography, prejudice, and party politics figured in their suffrage histories. The high
concentrations of Chinese immigrants in Pacific Coast states, of Native Americans
in the Mountain West, of Mexican Americans in southwestern states, and of Puerto
Rican immigrants in New York and western Massachusetts, created the possibility that
Anglo majorities in those states would politically marginalize these minorities. They
did just that. The 1965 Voting Rights Act, as amended over time, thus proscribes dis
criminatory treatment of these populations (Bridges 1997; Tucker 2009).'^ Their vot
ing rights are monitored by such advocacy groups as the ACLU Voting Rights Project,
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the Asian-American Legal Defense and Education Fund (AALDEF), the Latino Justice
Puerto Rican Legal Defense and Education Fund, and the Mexican-American Legal
Defense and Education Fund (MALDEF).
Taking the long view one can see, in Carrie Chapman Catt s pithy phrase, an “end
less chain of activity.” Since the Founding suffrage politics has continuously affected the
civic status of social groups, interparty competition, public policy, patterns of collective
action, constitutional law, judicial politics, legal mobilization, representation, and fed
eralism. Today suffrage politics does the same; tomorrow it will do so as well.

Notes
1. For extremely helpful comments on an earlier draft I thank David Bateman, Adam
Chamberlain, Boris Heersink, David Mayhew, Suzanne Mettler, Aziz Rana, Sid Tarrow,
and participants in the Colloquium on Law and Social Movements, Cornell University
School of Law, Spring, 2015.
2. See also http://explorepahistory.com/hmarker.php?markerId=i-A-3Ci and https://history.state.gov/departmenthistory/people/langston-john-mercer.
3. See also http://www.unf.edu/floridahistoryonline/CIR/intro.htm and http://www.
archives.com/experts/hait-michael/researching-african-american-soldiers-of-thecivil-war.html.

4. For a capsule description see http://history.house.gov/HistoricalHighlight/Detail/
36o84?ret=True.
5. For more see http://freedom50.org/.
6. See also http://www.nps.gov/semo/index.htm.
7. On policy drift see Mettler 2014,14,67.
8. But restrictions also occurred in the antebellum struggles over black suffrage, which have
recently and rightly attracted fresh scholarship. See Bateman 2014b and Budros 2013.
9. A profile of Lampi and his work are at http://www.neh.gov/humanities/2008/januaryfebruary/feature/the-orphan-scholar.
10. An important and little-known case is the Virginia Readjuster party of the 1880s. See http://
encyclopediavirginia.org/Readjuster_Party_Ihe#start_entry. Also Hahn 2003, ch. 8.
11. Later editions have slightly different wording of this oft-quoted passage.
12. For more see http://prospect.org/article/armed-resistance-civil-rights-movementcharles-e-cobb-and-danieUe-l-mcguire-forgotten.

13. The US case has yet to be properly assimilated into the vibrant discussion in comparative
political economy on the connections among franchise extensions, inequality, and redis
tribution. For a succinct summary of that literature see Slater et al. 2014,353-357.
14. See http://www.people-press.org/2009/06/18/obamas-ratings-remain -high-despitesome-policy-concerns/5/.
15. Navigate to http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2013/06/06/us/new-york-times-cbsnews-poll-june-20i3.html?_r=i8c.
16. For more see http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/vot/examine/activ_exam.php.

17. See also Louis De Sipio, “Demanding Equal Political Voice ... And Accepting Nothing
Less: The Quest for Latino Political Inclusion,” American Latino Theme Study, The
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Making of America, The National Park Service, online at http://www.nps.gov/latino/latinothemestudy/inclusion.htm.
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